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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/Respondent Donna Griffiths (Donna) comes now and replies to the
Respondent/Cross Appellant's Brief as stated below. Donna incorporates by reference herein her
Statement of the Case found in here Appellant's Brief on Appeal.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. Some of Stan's "facts" are not facts at all.
Stan continues to perpetuate the false assertion that his retirement is imminent. For
example, Stan asserts, "Stan is facing the prospect of early retirement due to his health
problems." (Response Br. 7, emphasis added). "Prospect" is defined as "[t]he possibility or
likelihood of some future event occurring." Oxford English Diet. (2nd ed. 532). Stan tries to
raise concerns he had shortly before the last day of trial, which was delayed, about his recent
neck surgery as if it were a permanent disability. There is no proof of the same. Stan testified
that he was "worried" and afraid he might have to retire early. (Trial Tr. 596-597) The trial judge
properly prevented him from providing any medical testimony. No medical professional was
called to testify and no medical records were placed into evidence.

B. Stan fails to assert the complete standard of standard of review.
On pages 9-10 of his Brief, Stan cites several cases that reference the "substantial and
competent evidence" and "abuse of discretion" standards which are partially correct. The full,
correct standard at this stage is set forth as follows:
When this Court reviews the decision of a district court
sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, the standard of
review is as follows:
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The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate)
record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow
from those findings. If those findings are so supported and
the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district
court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)
(quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758,
760 (2008)). Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the
magistrate court. Id. "Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm
or reverse the decisions of the district court."' Id. (quoting State v.
Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 514 [415] n. 1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n. 1
(2009)).
Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 16, 454 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2019).
C. Stan is still misreading the Bechtel case and its progeny, and misapplying the
Acceptance of the Benefits Doctrine.
1.

Stan could have a worse outcome on remand.

Stan makes the argument that there is no possibility of a worse outcome on remand. He
even goes so as far as to create a meaningless diagram that merely shows his argument. Stan's
position is that the Idaho Supreme Court cannot issue any mandate to provide Donna with more
relief or Stan with less relief, if the case is remanded with directions to change the Trial Court's
original decision. Stan asserts that because Donna did not appeal from the Magistrate's decisions
or "failed to challenge any of Stan's original property awards" that there is no possibility of a
worse outcome on remand for Stan. (Response Br. 13). Stan does not provide any authority that
would support this limitation of authority of this Court. Failing to cite authority constitutes a
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waiver of that issue on appeal. Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257
(2012).
Stan makes the claim, for example, that because he is only challenging the over-valuation
of an asset, that if there is to be revaluation of the asset on remand, the only direction of the new
value would have to be lower than originally found by the Trial Court. This is nonsense in that
this court would provide instructions to the Trial Court concerning how the valuation would take
place, and direct the District Court/Trial Court to act consistently with the directions of this
court. Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.3d 1212 (2003); Houska v. Houska, 97 Idaho 316,
543 P.2d 869 (1975). The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "In a divorce proceeding, the
magistrate, not this Court on Appeal, resolves the conflicting evidence and determines the
weight, credibility and inferences to be drawn from such evidence. McA.ffee v. McA.ffee, 132
Idaho 281, 287, 971 P.2d 734, 740 (Ct. App. 1999) citing Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124
Idaho 227, 238, 858 P.2d 766, 777 (Ct.App.1993). Using this reference, it could very well be that
the court makes adjustments against the interests of Stan, including the MVH being valued even
higher causing an even greater financial obligation from Stan to Donna. Contrary to Stan's
position, the District Court did not direct that only lower values were to be considered. The
District Court held that "the Court remands the Trial Court to further decide the valuation of the
Class A shares." (R. 315).
The Trial Court, upon having the case remanded, has the option of using the testimony
and evidence already presented and then making new findings of fact and conclusions of law, or
decide to order a new trial pursuant to IRFLP 807. There is no Idaho caselaw that restricts the
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valuation to what it was at the time of trial upon remand. Other states' appellate courts have
directed that the value be can be determined as of the date of rehearing following remand. For
example, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held:
In Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va.App. 588,400 S.E.2d 788 (1991), we
held that, upon remand, assets should be valued at the time of
rehearing. There, we were considering evaluation of jointly held
marital property, not separately held marital property. However,
we believe that the reasons for reevaluation on remand are the
same as in the original hearing-to obtain the most accurate
evaluation and equitable distribution.
A decision of this Court and decisions of courts of other
jurisdictions support the proposition that reevaluation should be
made on remand. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va.App. 113, 355 S.E.2d
18, 21 (1987).
Where fluctuations in value are so rapid as to be material between
the date of hearing and the date on which the actual division is
made, the decree should contain a provision permitting
modification taking account of the changes.
Bollenbach v. Bollenbach, 285 Minn. 418, 175 N.W.2d 148 (1970)
(holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained, the
decree should account for the change in value between the date of
the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the
decree, the distribution based on value at the distribution date); see
Cleverly v. Cleverly, 151 Vt. 351, 561 A.2d 99 (1989) (requiring
reevaluation upon remand).

Wagner v. Wagner, 15 Va. App. 120, 122,421 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (1992).
This case presents a near perfect set of facts to consider this issue as to whether a Trial
Court can or should consider a post-remand date to value an asset. Such facts include that almost
five years have gone by since the trial in this matter; the MVH units are fungible in nature, are
very likely to have dramatically increased in value, have provided lucrative rates of return; real
estate prices have risen, and additional facts would exist as to the financial situations of both
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parties, including Stan's health issues as he has raised, if any. Other contributing factors would
include dealing with the District Court's conveyance of $421,000.00 of funds originally awarded
to Donna by the Trial Court, but subsequently divided by the District Court with one-half going
to Stan. To restrict the Trial Court to using old values which do not reflect the true value of the
asset presently, does not serve the interest of justice.
The general rule that valuation should be as of the date of divorce is just that; a general
rule. Subsequent enhancements in value, post-divorce, are generally not considered, probably
because the division often takes place at the time of divorce and enhancements after the divorce
are done with separate property should not be considered. Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho
48, 896 P.2d 956 (1995). This court has also held:
There are exceptions to this rule [valuing the property at the time
of divorce]. The parties may stipulate to an earlier valuation date,
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,253, 92 P.3d 492, 503 (2004); the
valuation date will be before the trial if the trial court enters a
partial final judgment terminating the marriage in order to expedite
the later resolution of the property distribution issues, Brinkmeyer
v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599-600, 21 P.3d 918, 921-22
(2001 ); and the trial court may retain jurisdiction to value
retirement benefits after the actual date of divorce, Hunt v. Hunt,
137 Idaho 18, 21, 43 P.3d 777, 780 (2002).

Reed v. Reed, 157 Idaho 705, 711, 339 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2014).
For the same reasons as above, not only should the Trial Court be authorized to revalue
the properties, but also the ability to reallocate the property and obligations, including:
•

The possible reallocation of properties is especially acute as it pertains to the MVH
units discussed elsewhere herein. The MVH units should be the subject of a
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constructive trust or mandated sale. Changes or losses of value after so much time,
may require adjustments on value and distribution on remand. This is certainly a
possibility if Stan's "imminent" retirement existed as he alleged.
•

Reconsideration of spousal support because of the interconnection between Idaho
Code §§32-705 and 32-712.

•

Accounting for and reallocation of, the $133,139.00 of distributions from Mountain
View Hospital Stan received from the MVH units.

•

Accounting for and relocation of, the $40,140.86 of other MVH distributions released
to Stan.

•

Accounting for and reallocation of, the $106,666.67 from Summit Orthopedics Equity
(SOE).

•

Repayment, accounting for and reallocation of, the $421,000.00 which the District
Court transferred from Donna's awarded property to Stan, during the pendency of the
appeal.

•

2.

Attorney fees and costs being assessed on appeal.

There does not have to be an exhaustion of benefits before the Acceptance of
the Benefits Doctrine applies.

Both Stan's argument and the District Court's decision assert that before the Doctrine
applies, the benefits must be exhausted. Akin to this is the District Court's conclusion that the
benefits Stan accepted were de minimus. Stan did not address the de minimus determinations in
his brief. The District Court cited Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550, 553, 661 P.2d 335, 338
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(1985) for support of the exhaustion requirement. Burnham relates to the proposition that
acceptance of only part of the judgment does not preclude an appeal on other parts. Burnham
dealt with an exception to the doctrine of the Acceptance of the Benefits, not a modification of
the doctrine itself. While Burnham points out that there are exceptions, there is not one for
"exhaustion."
No rule is better settled than that a litigant who accepts the
benefits or any substantial [portion] of the benefits of a
judgment or decree is thereby estopped from reviewing and
escaping from its burdens. [She] cannot avail [herself] of its
advantages, and then question its disadvantages in a higher court.
Accordingly, it is well-settled law that an appellant who accepts
the benefits of a judgment cannot pursue an appeal that may
invalidate the rights to those benefits if successful. The
"acceptance of the benefits" doctrine provides that an appeal from
a judgment is prohibited when the appellant has voluntarily
accepted benefits from that judgment. (Emphasis added, footnotes
omitted)
Smith v. Smith, 893 A.2d 934 (Del. 2006).
Smith went on to cite literally a dozen cases from across the country as examples of the

well-settled nature of the Acceptance of the Benefits Doctrine. The "substantial" portion does
not necessarily relate to a majority of the property, but a portion that has substance.
Stan briefly raises a "fungible property" test in his brief. (Response Br. 18). He argues
that the MVH shares are fungible property, "and so Donna has not been harmed by their use." Id.
This makes no sense, and should be disregarded as no authority is cited. There is no element
under Bechtel and its progeny requiring that the appellee be "harmed." This is another throwaway argument without case law or other authority.
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The District Court accepted Stan's arguments that the additional elements of
"unconscionability," "prejudice" and/or "disadvantaged" must be shown before the Doctrine is
applied, which are again asserted in the current appeal. The District Court cites Long v

Hendricks, 117 Idaho 1051, 739 P.3d 1223 (1990) to support the theory that the Doctrine has
been "relaxed," and more so that it should now just be based on what's fair. This court ruled:
"We conclude that when he chose to appeal and not to accept the amount of the original
judgment that was tendered, he gave up the right to claim post judgment interest." Long, supra,
117 Idaho at 1052, 793 P.2d at 1224 (1990). Long affirms the doctrine, in dicta, and the case
does not modify it to being simply based upon equitable principles, but is narrow in its findings
that post judgment interest is not allowed if payment was tendered.
Stan suggests that he was "compelled" to live in the house so the doctrine did not apply
to any improvements. (R. 274). The District Court bought into this argument when it found that,
"it would be impossible to refrain from using those assets awarded." (R. 312). Stan attempts, in
an effort to water down the benefits, to bundle his living accommodations and simple
maintenance with extensive renovations, which the District Court found to be improvements. (R.
276; R. 312). However, there is distinction between being able to use a property and being
compelled to live in the same. There is also a difference between maintenance of property and
making voluntary, extensive renovations/improvements.
Stan attempts to inject into the Doctrine, the requirement of proof of misuse of the
property. (Response Br. 18-19). This too is not a correct legal standard, especially in Idaho.
Stan's brief discussion implies, without justification, that so long as he didn't "misuse" the
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money he took, the Doctrine should not apply to him. This is both false and is a strawman, in
which he pretends this is a test under the Doctrine, then explains how he wasn't guilty of it.
Again, without citation or authority, this issue should not be considered by the Court.
Stan's next creation is the supposed defense that he did not directly receive the funds. As
discussed in the Appellant's Brief, (Donna's Appellant Br. 11-12), SOE is a holding company
which transferred, on behalf of Stan, his distributions that he was entitled to receive as an
individual, to his medical practice. Also previously briefed, SOE did not have the authority to
transfer Stan's distributions to his other company without his consent, expressed, implied or by
inaction on the part of Stan.
D. In valuing the MVH units, the Trial Court acted within its discretion.

Stan's argues that Donna is not entitled to request this court to uphold the Trial Court's
value because of no cross appeal. As is a common thread in Stan's brief, Stan cites no authority
to support the same. The Appellant's Brief fully addresses the District Court's failure to look at
substantive evidence on this issue.
Stan now claims, for the first time on this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, that the
only per unit price of the MVH Class A units is $8,272 per Mr. Pinkerton's testimony. (Response
Br. 20-21 ). At trial and in his appeal to the District Court, Stan advocated that the value needed
to be the internal value of $7,441, and that Pinkerton's testimony should be rejected. (R. 324).
Now, Stan fully embraces one of Pinkerton's values, making statements such as "In Sum, the
District Court correctly accepted Donna's expert testimony on the issue and value and rejected
the use of a substitute value." (Response Br. 20). Stan's current arguments are completely
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opposite from his previous position.
The District Court did not remand the case with direction to find the value to be the
$8,272 as Stan implies. Rather, the District Court remanded "to further decide the valuation ... "
(R. 326). Stan attempts to dismiss the substantial evidence presented at trial in support of the
$9,191 value as merely "odds and ends." (Response Br. 23). Stan's approach is obviously to
discount evidence that supports the Trial Court's findings and conclusions, and tum this
appellate review into second guessing. In Stan's brief, he mentions often such phrases as "the
District Court took Mr. Pinkerton's at his word ... ", "the District Court correctly accepted
Donna's expert's testimony," "the District Court correctly rejected the Symbian value ... " etc.
(Response Br. 20; 21 ). The District Court heard none of the testimony at trial and such
statements demonstrate the error of the District Court in substituting its opinions for that of the
Trial Court.
Although Stan's brief was supposedly in response to Donna's Appellant's Brief, he
ignores the caselaw and arguments made in the Appellant's brief on the matter such as Dinneen
v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1975) and the extensive discussion that the court may not
arbitrarily discard the testimony, and how, in fact, the testimony was not rejected. Stan is guilty

of blatant and intentional avoidance of applicable law. The evidence on which the Trial Court
based its valuation of the MVH units qualified as substantial, and a reasonable mind would
accept it as such. "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
to support a conclusion." Hurtado v. Land 'O Lakes, Inc. 153 Idaho 13, 17, 278 P.3d 415, 419
(2012). "However, substantial evidence does not mean uncontradicted evidence." Maverick
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Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep't ofLabor, Admin. Review Bd., 739 F.3d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 2014);
See also, Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 644, 273 P.3d 685 (2012). The

fact that Stan (or the District Court) has different opinions and theories on how to value the
MVH shares does not, of course, mean the evidence presented by Donna must be rejected.
Not once did Stan discuss the fact that the $9,191 was based on an extensive appraisal,
with the units greatly appreciating with time. Nor does Stan discuss the buyer's sophistication in
regards to the value of the units.
E. The Trial Court acted within its discretion in disregarding tax consequences.

Stan concedes that the Trial Court is not mandated to reduce property values for possible
tax consequences. (R. 328). Stan also concedes that the Trial Court actually considered the
matter. Nevertheless, he still argues that a discount for tax consequences is mandated for the
MVH units in this case, regardless of if and when an actual sale took place. This issue is one of
discretion for the Trial Court.
Stan continues to argue that Donna "misses the more significant point" that she received
the liquid assets of the community estate which supposedly made it impossible for Stan to make
an equalization payment unless he were to sell "at least some" of his awarded property.
(Response Br. 24). Donna has never overlooked this issue. In fact, she alone tried to avoid the
potential tax issues in her proposal to have a constructive trust for the MVH units, which was
vigorously fought by Stan. Ironically, it is Stan who largely ignores the content in the
Appellant's Brief which discusses various options, including borrowing money or using his
significant assets as collateral. (Donna's Appellant Br. 24-25). Stan attempts to dismiss the same
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in a single sentence, arguing that such action would "triggering other tax consequences or else
loan costs." (Response Br. 27-28). This argument is quickly rebutted by the fact that interest on
post judgment obligations is part of Idaho law, including Idaho Code §28-22-104, cases cited
herein previously. See also, Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 759 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1988);

Beesley v. Beesley, 114 Idaho 536, 758 P.2d 695 (1988). Interest at the statutory rate was
imposed by the Trial Court. (R. 54). Consequently, there always was a cost to the obligation.
Stan's argument that he was without the ability to bring up the issue of tax consequences
for payment of the equalization obligation until appeal, is unfounded. Several avenues were
available to him including a Motion for Reconsideration (IRFLP 503) and/or a Motion for New
Trial (IRFLP 807). Instead, Stan wants this court to make factual findings, conclusions of law
and draw inferences that were not presented to the Trial Court. "Issues not raised at the trial court
level will not be considered for the first time on appeal." Davies v. Davies, 160 Idaho 74, 80, 368
P.3d 1017, 1023 (Ct. App. 2016).
Stan presents Carr v. Carr as authority for his theory that there should have been a
reduction of value for the MVH units awarded to him. The case is inapposite to this one at issue.
There, the divorcing parties owned a truck stop, and they were ordered to sell it and split the
proceeds. Carr v. Carr, 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304 (1985). Naturally, the court held that tax
consequences of such an immediate sale should be considered. Id. That is nothing like this case,
where all the MVH units were awarded to Stan, along with substantial other properties, and
where Stan wants a tax adjustment now for a sale that may or may not take place in the future.
Similarly, Batra v. Batra 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001) is nothing like this case.
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Batra involved stock options, some vested and some not, and tax consideration of units was not a
part of the decision. Why Stan would cite this case is somewhat of a mystery.

Dujon v. Olbricht, an unpublished opinion, involved sharing proceeds of a personal
injury settlement. It has nothing to do with the relief Stan seeks. Neither of these two recently
mentioned cases help Stan's cause. Nor does In the matter of Wolters, 168 N.H. 150, 123 A.3d
1051 (2015). Stan states that this New Hampshire case is "persuasive authority." (Response. Br.
16). Not so. That case held that it was improper for the Trial Court to reduce the value of
properties awarded to the spouses to account for the tax consequences.
We conclude, therefore, that, because sale or transfer of the
properties at issue was neither required by the trial court's order,
nor certain to occur within a short time after the divorce decree, the
trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the properties for
distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for
estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a
sale or transfer of the properties. Accordingly, we vacate the trial
court's distribution order and remand for distribution of assets
consistent with this opinion.

Wolters, supra, 178 NH @ 160.
Stan next cites to In re Telgener, 148 NH 190, 803 A.3d 1051 (2002), another New
Hampshire case. (Response. Br. 16). It rules that a court may consider tax consequences if the
property division is a taxable event, or will occur shortly thereafter. In re Telgener, 148 NH 190,
192, 803 A.3d 1051, 1053 (2002). That is not the case here.
A New Jersey case Stan cites, claiming it also supports his position, holds that tax
consideration in a property division may be considered if there is a taxable event that is required
by the divorce distribution of assets. Orgler v. Orgler, 237 NJ Super. 342, 354-556, 586 A.2d
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67, 23 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). If that case applied in Idaho, it merely states that the court

may consider tax consequences, not that it must do so. In that case the issue facing the court was
as follows:
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to deduct
from the value of the marital estate $1.2 million in hypothetical taxes,
payable upon the future sale or transfer of the marital assets distributed
to him.
Out-of-state cases are virtually unanimous in holding that hypothetical
taxes should not be deducted from the value of the marital assets.
For example, the California Supreme Court in In re Fonstein, 17 Cal.3d
738,552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, (Sup.Ct.1969), held that the trial
court erred in deducting hypothetical taxes against the value of the
husband's interest in his law partnership which he had received as part of
a community property distribution. The court reasoned: ... the court is
not required to speculate about what either or both of the spouses
may possibly do with his or her equal share and therefore to engraft
on the division further adjustments reflecting situations based on theory
rather than fact.
Regardless of the certainty that tax liability will be incurred if in the
future an asset is sold, liquidated or otherwise reduced to cash, the trial
court is not required to speculate on or consider such tax consequences
in the absence of proof that a taxable event has occurred during the
marriage or will occur in connection with the division of the community
property.
We adopt as sound the common theme found in each of these out-ofstate cases, that hypothetical tax consequences upon the future sale
or transfer of marital assets should not be deducted from present
value for equitable distribution purposes. The hypothetical tax is
simply too speculative to permit a reduction in in value. It is akin to the
potential brokerage commission on the future sale of a marital home, a
deduction we disallowed in Wadlow v. Wadlow, 200 N.J.Super. 372,
383-384, 491 A.2d 757 (App.Div.1985), as being a "speculative cost of
a speculative sale."
Id., 237 NJ Super.@ 354-55 (emphasis added; internal cite omitted).
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Again, with Orgler, it is difficult to understand how Stan thinks this helps his cause. It is,
however, authority for the fact that unless the sale is immediate (and is a taxable event), the court
is not required to adjust for tax consequences. Divorce itself, of course, is not a taxable event.
Stan adds that the court should have considered tax consequences because he "is facing
imminent retirement due to health problems." (Response Br. 17). There was nothing in the
record to indicate retirement was "imminent" as previously discussed. Regardless of conflicting
evidence as Stan may present, the focus must remain on whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the Trial Court's decision. Stan is merely forum-shopping through the appeals process
for a court willing to second guess the Trial Court.
Stan's final sentence in this section reads: "The Court cannot add new agenda items to
the District Court's remand, as Donna did not seek to address these items during the parties' first
appeal." (Response Br. 30). Stan is stating that the Idaho Supreme Court cannot supersede the
decision of a District Court. Again, no authority is cited for this absurd proposition, which
failure constitutes a waiver on this issue because he did not support his position with argument
and authority. Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012). Such
statement also capsulizes what Stan is trying to do in this case; to have this Court require the
Trial Court to value the assets as they were in 2015, discount the units for tax consequences,
allow Stan to keep the very significant distributions that have taken place in the last five years
from the MVH units without adjustment, and then reduce the equalization payment based upon
these now fictional values. Such actions would be a gross miscarriage of justice and be extremely
inequitable.
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Continuing the discussion from above, although in most cases value should be based
upon the value as of the time of divorce, if there is to a be a new valuation established, it should
be a fair one. Donna's first choice in this case is to reverse the portions of the District Court's
decision, remanding this and other issues back to the Trial Court and for this court to affirm the
Trial Court's decision. If the Trial Court's decision is not upheld, the Trial Court should be
empowered with sufficient authority to make a just and equitable division, which should include
a revaluation of the MVH units at the time of hearing/trial on remand and the ability to
reallocate assets as needed.
For the reasons listed above as to the Class A units ofMVH, Stan must also fail in his
attack on the valuation of the Class RE units of MVH. The Trial Court used the highest value
offered by the evidence, which is entirely proper. It is noteworthy that Stan offered no direct
evidence of the value he chose. He simply called a CPA, Mr. Oakey, who did not opine as to
any value, but merely took Mr. Pinkerton's value and discounted it for possible tax
consequences. His work stopped there and nothing about those actions support Stan's value of
the RE (real estate) units ofMVH.
As discussed above, the reduced, after-tax value is only used where sale of the units is
occurring immediately ("imminent") upon the property division. Unfortunately, the District
Court abandoned its role as an appellate court to determine whether there is evidence in the
record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in support of the decision made,
and substituted its opinion for that of the Trial Court's despite having not heard the testimony
and evidence offered at trial.
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F. Spousal Maintenance was properly awarded under Idaho Code § 32-705.

The Trial Court carefully considered and applied the factors in Idaho Code § 32-705, and
awarded $4,500.00 per month in spousal maintenance until Donna reached 62 years. (R. 59).
Stan attempts to reframe Donna's argument that Stan's health conditions, were they to
worsen and did in fact cause disability, could be addressed pursuant to a modification process as
a substitute for his appeal. Such is not the case. Stan is the one who is seeking a modification on
appeal based upon speculative evidence, blatantly trying to get an appellant court to reweigh the
evidence rather than looking to see if the trier of fact had substantial evidence to support its
findings, which, of course, there was in this case. Or stated differently, there was a sufficient
basis to reject Stan's testimony on the subject.
This court has held that a person requesting spousal support is not required to attempt to
support himself or herself by whatever employment is available, or if no employment is available
should a trial judge award maintenance. Theiss v. Theiss, 112 Idaho 681, 683, 735 P.2d 992, 994
(1987). Stan cites the Tisdale case for the proposition that spousal maintenance "should be
rehabilitative." In that case alimony was confirmed on appeal, but shortened to three years,
approximately the same amount as in this case. "The need of one spouse and the ability of the
other spouse to pay would become the primary basis for alimony awards." Tisdale v. Tisdale,
127 Idaho 331, 900 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1995). "Even ifthere exists conflicting evidence, we will
not disturb the trial court's findings and conclusions on appeal if they are based on substantial
evidence." Robinson v. Robinson, 136 Idaho 451, 35 P.3d 268 (2001). Robinson distinguished
Tisdale. It then stated, "Spousal support awards are not solely rehabilitative in nature." Id.
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"Reasonable needs" is not a formulaic and absolute standard based upon the parties'
solvency. There is no identifiable point of how much is "enough" as a matter oflaw. Rather,
"needs" is a relative standard based upon the parties' standard ofliving during the marriage.

Shurtliffv. Shurtliff, 112 Idaho 1031, 1035, 739 P.2d 330,334 (1987). Wilson v. Wilson, 131
Idaho 533, 537, 960 P.2d 1262, 1266 (2001) states in regards to spousal separation awards that:
"Even if there exists conflicting evidence, we will not disturb the trial court's findings and
conclusions on appeal if they are based on substantial evidence." In Wilson the award was
$7,500 per month for six years, and then $6,500 for five years. Like in the present case, Dr.
Wilson was a physician and Mrs. Wilson rarely worked outside the home. The above amounts
were confirmed on appeal. Wilson, supra, 131 Idaho at 537, 960 P.2d at 1265.
Although the magistrate judge did not explain how he reached the
specific figures for the amount and the duration of the award, the
judge did provide sufficient findings to indicate a basis for those
decisions. Further, the cases in Idaho indicate that we may
disregard the trial court's failure to state specific reasons in support
of its decision as to the amount and the duration of a spousal
maintenance award, if the reasons are clear from a reading of the
record. Id.
We do not expect mathematical precision in calculating to the
dollar how much maintenance is required, nor must the record
support a specific amount. There must simply be substantial and
competent evidence which provides a basis for the amount
awarded. We find the record supports the award in this case in the
amounts of $7,500 and $6,500.

In conclusion, even though the magistrate judge did not specify
how he calculated the duration and the amount of Frosty's spousal
maintenance award, we affirm the magistrate judge's decision
because the record contains substantial and competent evidence to
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support the magistrate judge's findings as to the duration and the
amount of the award.

Wilson, supra.
Stan relies largely upon Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007). In

Stewart, the Supreme Court held that the wife should not have to sell the community home in
order to access the equity to meet her reasonable needs after divorce. Stewart, supra, at 680, 152
P .3d at 551. Idaho Code § 32-705 and the above quoted court decisions embody Idaho's current
law regarding the award of spousal maintenance. The court properly considered all factors under
this Section, despite Stan's claims to the contrary.
Stan's claim that he is "in the twilight of his profession" is plain false. (Response. Br.
34). The Trial Court found he was in the prime of his profession, as far as income is concerned.
Regardless, the bar is set at whether Stan had to retire, which was not proved by Stan. His only
support for the idea that his income would not continue is his claimed sore neck, which had been
hurting for only a few weeks at the time of trial. (R. 51). Once again, Stan is asking this Court to
second guess the Trial Court, and considering that more than five years has gone by, assume that
he has retired.
Stan cites a number of cases, such as the Minnesota case cited (Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.
2d 18 (Minn. 1989). While comparisons can be useful, this is not an issue decided by algorithm,
but by the discretion of the Trial Court. As noted by both parties herein, there is the
interconnection between property division and spousal maintenance. There is substantial
evidence to support the Trial Court's decision.
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III.

RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL

A. The Trial Court did not err in admitting the testimony of Diane Barker.

Ms. Barker is a CPA, whose testimony and related exhibits were received for illustrative
purposes. (Trial Tr. 316-317). Her testimony consisted primarily of how different property
divisions would affect net worth of each of the parties over time. (Trial Tr. 304, 305, 345).
Stan's only argument is that the Trial Court erred in "admitting" Barker's testimony.
Stan falsely asserts that "The Court concluded that Stan would have an "'extreme cash
flow' from his assets and that Donna would only be getting a modest 2% return on her assets."
(R. 41) (Response. Br. 38) Such is a gross misrepresentation of the facts and conclusions of the
Trial Court. Stan combined two recitations of testimony in the Finding of Facts and presented
them to this court as Conclusions of Law, attributing both testimonial references as originating
from Barker. Findings 34 and 39 respectfully reads:
34. Pinkerton testified that the MVH stocks have an "extreme"
case flow. The stock resulted in $1.8 million distributioned to the
Griffiths in the last six years. In just one year, the stock yielded a
14.05% return and the class A stocks had increased in value 34%.
The stock is highly marketable.
39 Diane Barker testified that treasure bills could be counted on to
earn approximately 2% interest and inflation could be calculated at
about the same amount.
As noted, the "extreme cash flow" testimony came from Pinkerton, not Barker. The two
Findings of Fact were of what testimony was given, not what the return on the assets were.
Stan's assertion of these references do not constitute a conclusion oflaw or even establish a fact.
Even if the testimony was incorrect or inadmissible, the same would be harmless, as the District

20 - APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF/RESPONSE BRIEF

Court found. (IRCP 61, IRFLP 810)
Stan argues that Ms. Barker needed to be a software engineer, an economist, an attorney
and judge to testify. An expert has the ability to rely upon other disciplines, data and
information. We are well beyond using a slide rule or pencil and paper to make calculations.
Ms. Barker used a computer software program, one that she was specifically trained on, to
compute data into a form that could be easily understood by the court. All of the data and the
assumptions she made are in her reports, admitted as exhibits. Stan was certainly free to
challenge any assumptions she made. Stan's attack on Barker's testimony is at best a challenge
on the weight of the evidence. Stan did not present any testimony that contradicted the testimony
provided by Barker. As to the differences in potential earnings of the MVH units, the "extreme
cash flow" is undisputed. There is no testimony that would indicate that any of the other assets
would have the remote possibility of even approaching the return on investment the MVH has,
which Barker showed by the illustrative testimony on what would happen with various scenarios.
The small piece of testimony that Stan relies on to show that Barker only used a software
program. The figures that are put into the software program are based upon very specific and
disclosed, making them subject to review and criticism if incorrect. The same can be said for a
physicist using a calculator. Does the use of a calculator that any lay-person can use deny the
expertise of the physicist doing the calculations?
As to Barker's qualifications, she testified of her education and professional background.
(Trial Tr. 298-304). The applicable authority is Idaho Rule of Evidence 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
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the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill
experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Ms. Barker had technical or other specialized knowledge, which could assist the trial
judge to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, and was qualified by knowledge,
skill, experience, training and education. Stan cites three criminal law cases to try to denigrate
her as a witness. None of them is controlling or helpful with this case. Stan cites to Bromley v.
Garey. (Resp. Br. 23). Bromley was a products liability case involving a shotgun that fired when

dropped. "The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999). The court noted that the

expert's testimony must be based on a proper foundation, and not speculative. Id.
Stan argues that Barker's testimony should have been excluded because of "unverified
assumptions about discount rates, future interest rates, the parties' continued work lives, the
annual increases in Stan's income, and the future sale price of Mountain View units. It is clear
that an expert may and usually does rely on hearsay or other information not itself admissible in
evidence. In Lawton v. City ofPocatello, 126 Idaho 454,886 P.2d 330 (1994), the Supreme
Court stated:
An expert may rely on hearsay to form an opinion provided that it
is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions on the subject. I.R.E. 703. A trial court has
discretion in allowing an expert to render an opinion based on
inadmissible evidence so long as the opinion is reached through
independent judgment. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court's dismissal of the City's hearsay objection.
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See also, Basic American, Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 744, 992
P.2d 175, 193 (1999):
Trial courts have "broad discretion in the admission of evidence at
trial, and [their] decision to admit such evidence will be reversed
only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion." Empire
Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295,
304, 971 P.2d 1119, 1128 (1998). The same standard applies to the
admission of expert testimony. See id. The decision to permit an
expert to base his or her opinion on opinions or facts supplied by
others is also governed by the trial court's discretion. See 193
Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,494,943 P.2d 912,
920 (1997). The determination of an expert's qualifications is
id. There is no abuse
likewise a discretionary
matter. See
of discretion where the trial court perceives the issue in question as
discretionary, acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available
choices, and reaches its decision through an exercise of reason.
Even if Stan were correct in claiming unreliability as to Ms. Barker's evidence, it would
be harmless error. The Trial Court was quite limited in their reliance on Ms. Barker's testimony.
Although Stan has objected to her testimony, it appears he has not argued on appeal that her
report should be excluded. So, Barker's opinion would remain in the case either way. Also, Stan
presented no testimony to contradict the treasury rate nor did he provide any testimony as to
what the actual return on any of the assets would be.
Ms. Barker is a certified public accountant, and has experience and training in the field of
divorce financial planning. Her expertise and background were testified to at trial. (Trial Tr.
298-302). Stan ignores the rules of evidence when he claims her evidence should have been
excluded because of "unverified assumptions about; discount rates, future interest rates, the
parties' continued work lives, the annual increases in Stan's income, and the future sale price of
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Mountain View units." Trial Courts have "broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial,
and [their] decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of that discretion." Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295,
304, 971 P.2d 1119, 1128 (1998). The same standard applies to the admission of expert
testimony.
The extent of an expert's qualifications is likewise a discretionary matter. See Id. There is
no abuse of discretion where the Trial Court perceives the issue in question as discretionary, acts
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable
to the available choices, and reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. Basic American,

Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 744, 992 P.2d 175, 193 (1999).

B. The Trial Court did not err in the property division.
It is well-settled that, "The district court shall enter its findings, conclusion and

judgment dividing the community property in such a method and proportion as it deems
just." Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 88, 645 P.2d 319, 322 (1982), (overruled on other ground,

Griggs v. Griggs, 107 Idaho 123, 686 P.2d 68 (1982). Such 'just' division of the community
property does not require mathematical nicety, nor is it required that the property be distributed
in equal parts if the court finds special circumstances. Division of property is a factual question,
left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. Where the Trial Court elects an unequal
division of community property, "our inquiry is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the
judge has abused his discretion by doing so." Bailey v. Bailey, 107 Idaho 324, 328, 689 P.2d 216,
220 (1984), quoted by Lang v. Lang, 109 Idaho 802, 807, 711 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1985).
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Idaho Code 32-712 lists the factors which bear upon the decision whether or not to
unequally distribute the community property. Stan's brief, rather than addressing the issue
whether there is substantial evidence to support the Trial Court's decision, simply wants to
reargue the case and have this court second guess what was decided in the Trial Court. The Trial
Court evaluated and discussed in detail all of the factors in Idaho Code § 3 2-712 and the facts of
this case, which frankly are a classic case for unequal division, where there is a longtime
marriage, displaced stay at home spouse with a short possible work life, high income for the
working spouse, high return on investments awarded to the working spouse, etc.
The judge properly perceived the issue as a matter of discretion, and acted within the
outer boundaries of that discretion. Id. The same is true of the Trial Court in this case.
Stan makes much of Donna's testimony on the first day of trial, to the effect that she
would be satisfied with an equal property division if the same included an equal division of the
MVH units. Testimony offered at trial does not in and of itself become a binding agreement. As
outlined in Idaho Code§ 32-917, all settlements regarding separate and community property
must be in writing, executed and acknowledged by both parties to be binding. Stan is arguing
that there was binding a stipulation vis a vis the testimony. However, the testimony shows that
Donna wanted half of the MVH units held in a constructive trust for her benefit. This offer was
rejected by Stan, and therefore there was never a meeting of the minds in order to create a
binding agreement. (Trial Tr. 271, L. 22-24)
In his argument against the property division, Stan again raises the specter of his supposed
health problem. (Response. Br. 29). Further, had the court allowed Stan's argument that "if' his
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"neck thing" would soon lead to a disability or loss of earnings, it would have had to be
extremely speculative. The Trial Court would first have to assume that Stan would be forced into
an early retirement. It would have to ignore the fact that Stan was still practicing medicine
(apparently at full force) despite the recent surgery. Also, that he had disability insurance, that
would cover him should he need to take disability. (R. 38). Finally, the court would have
ignored the fact that a majority of Stan's income comes through passive returns from the MVH
units, not from his medical practice.

IV.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Donna should be awarded her attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against this
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 ( e)(I), and Idaho
Appellate Rule 41.

KEE Enterprises v. Smedley, 140, Idaho 746, 755, 101 P.3d 690, 699 (2004) is helpful in
considering Idaho Code § 12-121 (Where Appellant failed to provide argument or authority in
support of the only issues on appeal that were properly before the court, the appeal was brought
and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation and thus, Defendant was entitled
to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121). Idaho appellate courts
apply Rule 41. Anson v. Le Bois Race Track Inc., 130 Idaho 303, 939. P.2d 1382 (1997).
Where issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the
appellant fails to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion. Andrews v. Idaho

Forest Indus., Inc., 117 Idaho 195, 786 P.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1990). When, as here, an appellant
has merely disputed the Trial Court's factual findings by pointing to supposed conflicts in the
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evidence, and when the Trial Court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the
appellant is simply inviting the Appellate Court to second-guess the Trial Court on conflicting
evidence. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 576, 759 P.2d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 1988). In Krebs, the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the appellant did just that, and awarded respondent her attorney
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 because the appeal was brought
without foundation. Id.
On appeal to this court, Stan claims that the court abused its discretion regarding the
value of the MVH units, entitlement to spousal support, propriety of an unequal division of
property and a couple of evidentiary issues. However, it is respectfully suggested that he makes
no cogent legal argument justifying a reversal of the Trial Court's findings. Stan has failed to
demonstrate that the Trial Court's decisions were an abuse of discretion or were unsupported by
substantial and competent evidence. His argument that the valuation of MVH units was a
conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact is an example of the lack of foundation in his
arguments.
Therefore, Donna is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in responding
to this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l), and
Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

V.

CONCLUSION

Stan comes to the court primarily asking that it re-examine what the Trial Court has done,
rather than to show errors of law. His factual arguments are an example of seeking to have the
facts differently found, resulting in a different outcome. He does not establish that the facts must
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have been found differently, or that they necessarily led to a different conclusion. The findings,
conclusions and orders of the Trial Court must be affirmed.
Donna is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
DATED: February 25, 2020.
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